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Executive Summary
from studying hotel markets, however, 
lies scattered in bits and pieces across 
the landscape of the professional and 
academic literature. This report consoli-
dates the lessons of hotel markets in the 
past two decades. Specifi cally, the report 
covers developments in our understand-
ing of hotel space markets, equilibrium 
in hotel markets, cyclical patterns, leads 
and lags, overbuilding, hotel capitaliza-
tion rates, the behavior of transacting 
parties, and debt-fi nancing alternatives. 
Here are  eight “rules of the road” for ne-
gotiating the obstacles to profi ts and re-
turns that hotel markets present. 
The “rules” are as follows: (1) The 
“tale of two cities” rule explains that 
changes in rate and occupancy do not 
automatically translate into changes in 
property values. Thus, property operators 
are not exclusively responsible for 
changes in valuation. (2) One has to keep 
the benchmarks handy (including such 
measurements as market equilibrium). 
(3) The cyclical nature of hotel occupancy 
and rates is well recognized and can aid in 
predicting performance. (4) Various time 
lags aff ect hotel market cycles. The eff ects 
of economic changes on rooms demand 
Eight Rules
for Competing in 
Hotel Real Estate Markets
By John B. Corgel, Ph.D.
DATA REGARDING HOTEL MARKETS’ BEHAVIOR now exist through more than one complete market cycle, as well as through the wide variety of environmental conditions of the past 15 years. Those conditions include two general eco-
nomic recessions, two wars, an unprecedented set of catastrophic events, and many 
local situations that aff ected travel and hotel-market activity. The knowledge gained 
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can show up in a matter of weeks, for 
example, but it appears that development 
plans lag changes in demand by as little 
as one year for limited-demand properties 
and as much as two years or more for 
full-service properties. (5) Except for the 
government-induced overbuilding of the 
1980s, the hotel industry’s development 
pattern has largely been self-correcting. 
When demand weakened in 2001, for 
instance, the supply overhang was not 
excessive. (6) Hotel capitalization rates can 
be subject to large swings (as much as 8 to 
12 percent), but cap rates are on balance 
countercyclical. They are more subject to 
interest-rate movements than other forms 
of real estate, and they eventually revert 
to historic averages. (7) Notwithstanding 
any of the other rules, and regardless 
of what fi nancial markets might show, 
buyers and sellers can mess things up 
by behaving in idiosyncratic fashion 
and will tend to overprice or underprice 
assets according to their own perceptions. 
(8) Although hotel investors seem to 
prefer to lock in fi xed-rate fi nancing, 
fl oating interest rates seem better matched 
to the hotel industry’s operating-revenue 
characteristics.
Given the accumulated information 
about hotel-market cycles, it seems likely 
that the industry will not repeat its over-
building mistake in this or future cycles. 
In the near future, however, we will be 
able to observe the nature of a cyclical 
peak in many markets.
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CHR Reports
has been learned about hotel-market behavior, 
I also speculate on the lessons of the next ten 
years. In this report I propose eight “rules of 
the road” for negotiating the obstacles to profi ts 
and returns presented by hotel markets. 
The industry’s eff orts to meet hotel market-
research challenges have been aided by several 
industry fi rms. Smith Travel Research (STR), 
for example, began assembling comprehensive 
The knowledge gained from studying hotel-
market performance, however, exists as bits 
and pieces scattered across the landscape of the 
professional and academic publications. This 
report represents an attempt to consolidate this 
knowledge in a single location by off ering my 
interpretation of the implications of the many 
studies (rather than produce a traditional lit-
erature review). In addition to discussing what 
Eight Rules
for Competing in
Hotel Real Estate Markets 
by John B. Corgel, Ph.D.
ASIZEABLE LITERATURE that focuses on questions about how hotel mar-kets operate has emerged during the past decade. The fi ndings from these studies off er help and guidance to managers and investors in avoiding mis-
takes in hotel operations, acquisition, and development.
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2 D. DiPasquale and W. Wheaton, “The Cost of Capital, 
Tax Reform, and the Future of Rental Housing,” Journal of 
Urban Economics, Vol. 31, No. 3 (1992), pp. 337-359.
We now have hotel market data 
that cover a full cycle—including 
recession, war, and catastrophe.
hotel industry statistics for the entire U.S. in 
1987. Because of the cooperation that many 
hotel companies give STR, managers with vari-
ous interests in hotel markets have access to de-
mand, supply, average daily rate (ADR), and oc-
cupancy data covering virtually every local hotel 
market in the nation. Perhaps more important, 
these data, together with hotel transaction da-
tabases and detailed construction information 
about current and planned activity developed 
by such fi rms as HVS International, Lodging 
Econometrics, PKF Hospitality Research, and 
STR/Dodge, reveal hotel markets’ behavior. 
These data record the industry’s performance 
through more than one complete market cycle, 
as well as through the following environmental 
conditions of the past 15 years:
(1) Two economic recessions,
(2) Two wars,
(3) An unprecedented set of catastrophic 
events, and
(4) Many localized occurrences that aff ected 
travel and hotel-market activity.
Improvements in the market data over 
the past two decades are equally impressive for 
other property types, such as offi  ce and retail. 
These improvements contribute to the general 
understanding of real-estate market behavior. 
Hence, the views presented in this paper come 
from my reading and thinking about both hotel 
markets and markets for other property types.1
Specifi cally, this report covers developments 
in our understanding of hotel space markets, 
equilibrium in hotel markets, cyclical patterns, 
leads and lags, overbuilding, hotel capitaliza-
tion rates, the behavior of transacting parties, 
and debt-fi nancing alternatives. I conclude by 
off ering views concerning what may be learned 
about hotel markets in the near future as this 
market moves to a new peak.
Rule #1: RevPARs and Property 
Values Are a “Tale of Two Cities”
Modern approaches to property-market analysis 
proceed with the recognition that the market 
for nonsecuritized real estate involves two dis-
tinct, albeit interrelated markets—the market 
in which real estate is used for production of 
periodic income (i.e., the space market) and 
the market for capital assets (i.e., the asset or 
capital market). This distinction occurs because 
property owners typically are not the users of the 
space—a condition that is particularly evident 
in hotel markets. Nevertheless, the space and 
asset markets have two permanent bonds.2 First, 
rent levels and room rates determined in the 
space markets substantially aff ect asset-market 
demand. Second, supply additions from con-
struction in the asset markets not only drive 
down the prices of the assets, but also reduce 
rents and room rates as availabilities are added 
to the space market.
During the past two decades property inves-
tors witnessed space- and asset-market fl uctua-
tions triggered by actions that occurred in both 
markets. The demand-based recessions of the 
early 1980s produced sizeable rent and prop-
erty-price swings. The real estate implosion of 
the early 1990s resulted from a combination of 
excessive supply growth originating in the asset 
market followed by an economic recession that 
was accelerated by war—all of which stressed 
the space market. The economic conditions ex-
perienced in 2001 and 2002 resemble those of 
the early 1980s, with the added dimension of 
catastrophic events and war. 
1 This article represents a compilation of ideas and anal-
ysis presented in my previously published articles and working 
papers (as well as the work of others). Citations for all sources 
appear in the footnotes. Some paragraphs that appear in this 
report are drawn from my earlier works.
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Hotel operators cannot assume that 
all of the RevPAR and NOI gains which 
they help create will translate directly 
into property value increases.
The academic and professional literature 
provides limited guidance for answering empir-
ical questions about how events in one of these 
markets aff ect performance in the other, such 
as the extent to which revenue swings (e.g., 
those experienced in the hotel sector during 
the second half of 2001) translate into property-
value adjustments. O’Neill and Lloyd-Jones esti-
mated a 5- to 10-percent loss in value following 
the 20-percent fall in hotel revenues during the 
recession and catastrophic events of 2001 and 
2002 (including 9/11, SARS, and war).3 This 
result conforms to the fi ndings of Corcoran, 
who concludes that property-value losses dur-
ing an economic downturn should not mirror 
revenue losses, because the discounted value of 
net rent lost during a short recession is small 
relative to the discounted value of net rent dur-
ing the economic life of the property.  
A downturn also may elevate capitaliza-
tion rates. Economists at PKF Hospitality 
Research and Torto Wheaton Research (TWR) 
performed a series of experiments using a pro-
prietary hotel-capitalization model to judge the 
capital market’s response to the events of 2001 
and 2002.5 With respect to the magnitude of 
response of capitalization rates in the hotel-
asset market to changes in the space market, a 
1-percent change in occupancy resulted in ap-
proximately a fi ve-basis-point change in hotel 
capitalization rates. The same analysis found 
that a 1-percent change in ADR produced only 
about a one-basis-point change in hotel capital-
ization rates. These studies suggest that the ef-
fects of the substantial revenue declines in 2001 
and 2002 equate to an increase of more than 
100 basis points in capitalization rates. An in-
crease in capitalization rates of this magnitude 
translates into approximately a 10-percent de-
cline in values. Thus, the immediate reduction 
in value through both the numerator and de-
nominator from the combination of recession 
and catastrophic events was approximately 10 
to 15 percent. Evidence presented later in this 
paper supports the conclusion that this reduc-
tion was temporary, as hotel values began to 
recover late in 2002.
In summary, hotel operators cannot auto-
matically assume that all of the RevPAR and 
NOI gains which they help create translate 
directly into property value increases (nor do 
losses automatically mean value declines). By 
the same token, owners cannot blame or cred-
it operators for property-value movements. 
Important economic factors are common to 
both markets, but we now know that some 
forces aff ecting hotel property values have little 
relationship to short-run NOI.  
Rule #2: Have Benchmarking 
Tools Handy
The implications one draws regarding unantici-
pated changes to space- and asset-market stabil-
ity come from comparative analyses of the pre-
vailing conditions prior to and following such 
changes. These analyses therefore depend on 
the availability of reliable market benchmarks, 
particularly long-run equilibrium conditions. 
While several parties have attempted to quantify 
equilibrium conditions in real estate markets 
during the past two decades, additional work is 
needed to develop practical equilibrium bench-
marks. The asset market operates in equilibrium 
3 J.W. O’Neill and A. R. Lloyd-Jones, “Hotel Values 
in the Aftermath of September 11, 2001,” Cornell Hotel and 
Restaurant Administration Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 6 (December 
2001), pp. 10-21; and J.W. O’Neill and A. R. Lloyd-Jones, 
“Hotel Values and Strategic Implications,” Cornell Hotel and 
Restaurant Administration Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 6 (December 
2002), pp. 53-64.
4 P.J. Corcoran, “Firming Property Prices and Weak 
Cash Flows,” Journal of Portfolio Management, Special Issue 
2003, pp. 35-44.
5 For a similar analysis, see: P. Sivitanides, J. Southard, 
R.G. Torto, and W.C. Wheaton, “The Determinants of 
Appraisal-Based Capitalization Rates,” Real Estate Finance, 
Vol. 18 (2001), pp. 27-37.
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when existing asset values equal replacement 
costs. As Hendershott shows, however, values 
in the asset market will equal replacement costs 
only when space-market equilibrium conditions 
are satisfi ed.6  
Space markets rarely achieve full occupan-
cy. Therefore, they operate somewhat like la-
bor markets in that the long-run equilibrium 
(natural) vacancy rate behaves similarly to the 
natural rate of unemployment. This assump-
tion, supported by several decades of observa-
tion, suggests that the adjustment of rents and 
ADRs to equilibrium levels can be explained 
by the diff erence between the natural vacancy 
rate, VN, and the actual vacancy rate, VA, and 
the rate of property-expense infl ation. Rosen 
and Smith were fi rst to estimate VN beginning 
with the following functional form:7
 ∆R= f (∆EXP, VN - VA), (1)
where ∆R is the percentage change in rents 
or ADRs and ∆EXP is the property-expense-
infl ation rate. The equation says that the 
change in rents, ∆R, is explained by infl ation 
and the extent of disequilibrium in the space 
market.8
A number of studies use data from non-
residential property markets to confi rm the va-
lidity of the procedure presented in Equation 
1. These studies also show that natural vacancy 
rates diff er across geographic areas and proper-
ty markets and that those diff erences are relat-
ed to expected changes in the local demand for 
space. For hotel markets, deRoos shows how the 
natural-occupancy-rate concept can be applied 
to quantify excess demand and, consequently, 
identify supply–demand gaps that signal future 
hotel-property development.9 He found that all 
but one of the largest 24 MSAs in 1998 had a 
long-run need for additional supply. 
Equilibrium Rent and ADR
Critiques of the natural-vacancy-rate approach 
focus on its estimation in isolation from long-
run equilibrium rent. Direct estimation of 
equilibrium rent is diffi  cult, however, requir-
ing the simultaneous estimation of several 
equations. In the absence of direct estimates, 
Henderschott’s conceptualization of equilib-
rium rent in a particular period provides a 
useful microeconomic foundation:10
 g* (1 - VN) = rr + d + exp, (2)
where g* is the equilibrium real gross rent per 
dollar of the real replacement cost of occupied 
space, rr represents fi nancing costs expressed as 
a real rate of return, d is the rate of economic 
depreciation, and exp is the ratio of operat-
ing expense to asset replacement cost. The 
concept of equilibrium ADR operates in the 
same way as that of equilibrium rent. Beyond 
the approaches used by analysts to back into 
the ADR that justifi es construction, though, no 
research has appeared that formally estimates 
an equilibrium equation.11
Tobin’s q and the Asset Market
The ratio of property value to replacement costs 
represents the key equilibrium concept in the 
asset market. This measure, known as Tobin’s 
q, and its interpretations originate from Tobin’s 
theory of fi xed-capital investment.12 Tobin pro-
6 P.H. Henderschott, “Valuing Properties when 
Comparable Sales Do Not Exist and the Market Is in 
Disequilibrium,” Journal of Property Research, Vol. 13 (1996), 
pp. 57-66.
7 K. Rosen and L. Smith, “The Price Adjustment Process 
for Rental Housing and the Natural Vacancy Rate,” American 
Economic Review, Vol. 73, No. l (1983), pp. 779-786.
8 The following regression equation then may be writ-
ten: ∆R = bo + b1∆EXP + b2 (VN - VA) + e. If by assump-
tion the unobservable natural vacancy rate does not vary 
greatly over time, then VN and its coeffi  cient b2 are constant, 
and therefore become embedded in the intercept term, bo. 
Because in theory expense changes and the degree of disequi-
librium in the space market (i.e., VN - VA) are the only vari-
ables contributing to rental adjustment, the intercept term 
should not contain information about omitted variables. The 
intercept term contains only b2VN. The fi nal estimating form 
of the regression equation now becomes: R= bo + b1∆EXP + 
b2VA + e. Given that bo = b2VN, then VN = bo / b2. 
9 J.A. deRoos, “Natural Occupancy Rates and 
Development Gaps,” Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration 
Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 2 (April 1999), pp. 14-22.
10 Hendershott, op.cit.
11 Practitioners back into estimates of the ADR that 
justify construction using algorithm called the Hubbart 
formula. 
12 J. Tobin, “A General Equilibrium Approach to 
Monetary Theory,” Journal of Money Credit and Banking, Vol. 1 
(November 1969), pp. 15–27.
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Cyclical patterns in the hotel market 
emanate from business-cycle 
patterns, albeit with lags.
posed that fi rms will freely alter their stock of 
investments until q reaches unity. Extending 
this concept to the case of real-estate markets, 
when q > 1 in the asset market, property de-
velopment occurs until q reaches 1. 
The relationship between hotel property 
values and replacement costs received wide-
spread attention in the popular press during 
the 1990s as the q-ratio dipped below 0.5 and 
then recovered to 1.0 and above. Analysts con-
tinue to watch the behavior of the hotel q-
ratio in an eff ort to judge the level of future 
supply growth and acquisition opportunities. 
In a 1997 analysis, I presented adaptations of 
the q-ratio to real estate and proposed caution-
ary notes to users about problems of interpreta-
tion and measurement of q-ratio components.13
These are:
(1) Proper specifi cation of the real estate 
market q-ratio requires careful estimation 
of a market value or a price index in the 
numerator. 
(2) In the denominator, replacement cost 
should be indexed and economic-deprecia-
tion adjustments introduced when the q-
ratio is used to analyze market conditions 
for existing property transactions.
Equilibrium in Securitized Real Estate 
Markets
The equilibrium principle analogous to the q-
ratio in the securitized real estate market is the 
relationship between share price (SP) and net 
asset value (NAV), defi ned as follows:
NAV = (Market Value of All Properties + 
Other Assets – Total Liabilities)  / Number of 
Shares Outstanding. (3)
Thus, the percentage premium or discount 
(PD) to NAV is:
 PD = (SP – NAV) / NAV. (4)
The general equilibrium conditions in the 
space and asset markets are conceptually and 
graphically linked in work by Fisher, Hudson-
Wilson, and Wurtzebach.14 Exhibit 1 extends 
their presentation of equilibrium conditions in 
the space and asset markets (i.e., fi rst two sets 
of graphs, on the left) to include the real estate 
securities market for the purpose of establish-
ing the general equilibrium conditions that tie 
the three real estate markets together. 
The third set of graphs, on the right, pres-
ents short-run and long-run equilibrium condi-
tions in the real estate securities market. This 
market reaches long-run equilibrium when the 
market capitalization of a fi rm, scaled by the 
number of units owned, P, equals the equity 
value of the fi rm’s assets (i.e., NAV times the 
number of shares outstanding), scaled by the 
number of units owned by the fi rm (N). The 
NAV literature continues to grow each year 
and most REIT analysts, including those who 
follow the 16 lodging REITs, rely on NAV pre-
miums and discount information to evaluate 
arbitrage opportunities.
Rule #3: The Cycle Guides Your 
Forecasts
The existence of hotel market cycles is a well-
recognized phenomenon.15 Smooth and regu-
lar fl uctuations around an equilibrium level 
occur for two reasons. First, a strong correla-
tion exists between hotel demand and mea-
13 See: J.B. Corgel, “Real Estate q,” Real Estate Research 
Institute Working Paper, 1997.
14 J.D. Fisher, S. Hudson-Wilson, and C.H. Wurtzebach, 
“Equilibrium in Commercial Real Estate Markets—Linking 
Space and Capital Market,” Journal of Portfolio Management, 
Vol. 19 (Summer 1993), pp. 101–107
15 For a recent literature review of the real-estate-cycle 
literature, see: G.R. Mueller, “What Will the Next Real Estate 
Cycle Look Like?,” Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, 
Vol. 8, No. 2 (2002), pp. 115-125; the seminal work on ho-
tel market cycles is: W. Wheaton and L. Rossoff , “The Cyclic 
Behavior of the U.S. Lodging Industry,” Real Estate Economics, 
Vol. 26, No. l (1998), pp. 67-82.
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EXHIBIT 1
THRE E  RE A L E STA TE  M A RKE TS IN E QU ILIB RIU M
Note: This exhibit shows the economic relationships among the following three real estate markets: the space market 
(rental), the unsecuritized asset market (property), and the securitized asset market (REITs or property shares). The 
graphs allow static comparisons to trace the way a shock experienced in one market affects prices in the other 
two, including changes in long-run supply. Developed by the author for: “Three Markets in Equilibrium,” Real Estate 
Finance, Vol. 15 (Spring 1998), pp. 23-31.
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sures of national and local economic activity 
(e.g., real personal income and employment). 
Consequently, with respect to demand-side 
infl uences, cyclical patterns in hotel market-
performance measures emanate from business-
cycle patterns. Moreover, supply changes logi-
cally follow shifts in demand, albeit with long 
delivery lags. If the business cycle is smooth 
and construction predictably responds, then 
the hotel market cycle will follow a correspond-
ingly smooth path over time.16
16 Torto and Wheaton question the existence of a hotel 
market cycle during which supply responds predictably to de-
mand changes originating in the business cycle. They argue 
that the pattern of hotel construction observed during recent 
decades suggests that this cycle is instead endogenous (i.e., 
supply has a “mind of its own”). See: R.G. Torto and W.C. 
Wheaton, Real Estate Cycles and Outlook 2002 (Boston: Torto 
Wheaton Research, 2002).
S
S
CAP RATE
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EXHIBIT 2
HISTORICA L P A TTE RNS OF U.S. HOTE L OCCU P A NCY A ND ADR, 1959–2005
17 Smith Travel Research began its regular reporting of 
hotel data in 1988. The availability of these data enabled ho-
tel managers to begin making better decisions about room 
pricing in response to changing demand.
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Note: Source is PKF Consulting. Annual ADRs are adjusted for infl ation. Figures for 2005 are estimates. The 
cycles shown are infl uenced by macroeconomic activity and changes in real estate market conditions.
Real
ADR
Occupancy
Abnormally wide swings in hotel-market 
performance that werer observed during re-
cent decades occurred because of shocks to the 
economy and to hotel markets. These events af-
fected the supply of hotel rooms, the demand 
for hotel room-nights, or both. Government 
tax policy in the early 1980s, for instance, ar-
tifi cially infl ated the hotel supply. With occu-
pancy already below normal levels in the late 
1980s, the recession and Gulf War in the early 
1990s stymied the market’s recovery. Similarly, 
the combined eff ects of the demand-based gen-
eral economic recession that began in 2001, 
the terrorist attacks in September 2001 (which 
squelched the demand for air travel), and the 
Iraqi war produced steep declines in hotel oc-
cupancy and ADR during 2001 and 2002. 
Exhibit 2 shows the cyclical patterns of 
occupancy and real ADR for U.S. hotels dur-
ing the past few decades. The following obser-
vations come from an examination of these 
trends: 
(1) Occupancy has a defi nite cyclical pattern. 
This pattern appeared to smooth out dur-
ing the 1980s and then became more vola-
tile since the mid-1990s despite lower in-
formation costs.17
(2) The pattern of real ADR also appears cycli-
cal, albeit with an upward trend.
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(5) The post-2002 recovery occurred more 
quickly than many analysts expected.
Market Performance through the 
Cycle
The economics of hotel markets suggest that 
occupancy represents the current relationship 
between demand and supply. Occupancy reach-
es levels above normal (that is, above natural 
occupancy) when demand exceeds supply (or 
sinks below normal when demand is less than 
supply). During periods of abnormally high 
occupancy, ADR increases, causing occupancy 
to fall (and during abnormally low occupancy, 
ADR decreases, leading to rising occupancy). 
The economics of hotel markets also suggest 
that ADR represents the current relationship 
(3) During certain periods (e.g., 1972–1974 
and 1985–1987), occupancy and real ADR 
moved in opposite directions. These atypi-
cal and anomalous movements are likely 
the result of the federal government’s mon-
etary or tax policies during those times.18
(4) Since the early 1990s and at certain peri-
ods prior to 1990, occupancy leads ADR 
in both upward and downward directions. 
18 For a discussion of real estate cycle eff ects from poli-
cies in the early 1970s, see: J.L. King and T.E. McCue, “Offi  ce 
Building Investment and the Macroeconomy: Empirical 
Evidence 1973-85,” AREUEA Journal, Vol. 15, No. 3 (1987), 
pp. 234-255. The disruptive eff ects of federal policies from 
the early 1980s on real estate markets are documented in: P.H. 
Hendershott and E. Kane, “Causes and Consequences of the 
1980s’ Commercial Construction Boom,” Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance, Vol. 5 (1992), pp. 61-70.
Note:  The pattern presented in this exhibit closely resembles the pattern of historical data in Exhibit 2. Point A 
on the graph indicates when market occupancy equals natural occupancy. At this point, hotel managers become 
more aggressive in raising room rates. Point B indicates when market ADR equals equilibrium ADR and construction 
becomes feasible. Developed by the author for: “Three Markets in Equilibrium,” Real Estate Finance, Vol. 15 (Spring 
1998), pp. 23-31.
EXHIBIT 3
HOTE L M A RKE T CYCLE S
Peak of previous 
cycle, 1998
Peak of current 
cycle (?)
Equilibrium ADR
Occupancy 
percentage
Natural occupancy 
percentage
Trough of current 
cycle, 2002
ADR
●A
●B
Time
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Market  Demand    
Condition Response Occupancy ADR Supply
 Upward   Normal rate  Immediately   Increases lag  Construction 
 movement  of increase increases with   occupancy,   begins as ADR 
 toward peak  demand accelerate as   approaches 
    occupancy    feasibility level
    approaches
    natural level
 Downward   Normal  Decrease   Decrease   Construction  
 movement from  decline occurs occurs with a   slowly halts
 peak  immediately defi nite lag
 Severe   Rapid  Immediate and  Decrease with  Construction   
 demand-based  decline rapid decline short lag stops abruptly
 recession
 War or  Rapid  Immediate and  May be frozen  Construction 
 catastrophic  decline rapid decline until duration is  delayed until 
 event   determined duration is     
     determined
between demand and supply. Accordingly, 
ADR reaches levels above normal (that is, 
equilibrium ADR) when demand exceeds sup-
ply. (The reverse is true when supply exceeds 
demand; ADR falls below equilibrium.) Once 
ADR reaches and then exceeds the equilibrium 
level, development becomes feasible. In time, 
ADR and occupancy begin to stabilize as hotel 
construction satisfi es the excess demand that 
drove occupancy above the natural level and 
ADR above the equilibrium level. As more 
rooms are added to the stock, occupancy and 
ADR fall.  
Exhibit 3 (on the previous page) presents 
a graphical representation of the hotel-market 
cycle. The graph incorporates the following 
key assumptions. First, hotel markets general-
ly operate in the fashion that I just explained. 
Second, an inherent delay (i.e., delivery lag) ex-
ists between the time when a shift in demand 
is realized and the time development plan-
ning and construction can be completed to 
meet that demand. Because of this lag and the 
fact that developers do not act simultaneous-
ly, supply growth continues after the change 
in demand is satisfi ed. Finally, the hotel-mar-
ket cycle involves an observable, yet empirical-
ly unspecifi ed, lag between occupancy changes 
and the resulting ADR adjustment. As markets 
move from the peak of the cycle to the trough, 
EXHIBIT 4
SU M M A RY OF HOTE L M A RKE T P ROCE SSE S
Developed by the author for: “How to Determine the Future Direction of Hotel Capitalization Rates,” Real Estate 
Issues, Vol. 28 (Winter 2003), pp. 44–48.
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as occurred between 1998 and 2002, softness 
in demand forces hotel managers to reduce 
room rates in an eff ort to maintain occupan-
cy.19 The reduced rates are intended to retard 
the decline in occupancy during periods when 
demand drops. The opposite of this process oc-
curs as markets move from the cycle’s trough 
to its peak. An increase in the demand for ho-
tel rooms causes immediate improvements in 
occupancy. The upward trend in occupancy 
moderates as hotel managers raise room rates, 
which begins to occur as occupancy approaches 
the natural level of the market. 
Exhibit 4 provides a summary of how mar-
kets “should” behave through an ordinary cycle 
and in response to external events.
Rule #4: Things Don’t Happen 
All at Once
Because market relationships seldom involve 
instantaneous adjustments, leads and lags 
among the variables that determine perfor-
mance become important considerations for 
understanding how markets behave. Timing 
shapes hotel markets in several ways. These 
are identifi ed in the following fi ve questions 
and answers:
(1) How long does it take for hotel room de-
mand to respond to changes in key eco-
nomic variables, such as personal income, 
GDP, and employment? 
Given that a hotel stay is eff ectively a luxu-
ry good, one would expect hotel expenditures 
to be among the fi rst to be cut from house-
hold and business budgets during periods of 
economic distress and among the last expen-
ditures to be restored during recovery. Hence, 
hotels are generally considered to lead in reces-
sion and lag in recovery. Conventional wisdom 
says that the response time to recession or re-
covery is two calendar quarters. Hotel demand, 
therefore, should be sensitive to income—with 
estimates of income elasticity equaling 1.2 and 
above.20 However, recent elasticity estimates 
of less than 1.0 by Canina and Carvell using 
property-level data cast doubt on conventional 
wisdom.21 With respect to lags, TWR conduct-
ed an analysis of STR data from 1988 through 
2002 using the demand equation from a hotel-
market econometric model. This analysis sug-
gests that, although complete adjustment takes 
two quarters, 65 to 70 percent of the adjust-
ment occurs in the initial quarter. This means 
that much of the eff ect from changes in the 
economy on rooms sold happens within a few 
weeks.
(2) How long does it take for space-market-to-
property-market adjustments to occur? 
A lag of one quarter should be expected for 
a change in occupancy to be refl ected in capi-
talization rates and two quarters for changes in 
ADR to appear in capitalization rates. Given 
the one- to two-quarter lag, for example, most 
of the revenue eff ects were impounded into 
property values by the end of the second quar-
ter of 2002 following the recession and cata-
strophic events of the third quarter of 2001. 
(3)  How long is the delivery lag (i.e., construc-
tion lag)? 
Delivery lag has the following two compo-
nents: the time it takes to decide to develop 
and to plan construction following the recog-
nition of a shift in demand, and the actual 
construction period. Consequently, delivery 
19 Estimates by Wheaton and Rossoff  and others of the 
price elasticity of demand for hotel rooms place the value at 
approximately -.4 (see: Wheaton and Rossoff , op.cit.). This 
means that when ADR falls revenue will likely fall because the 
positive revenue eff ect of the increase in the number of rooms 
sold will not off set the negative revenue eff ect of ADR erosion. 
Canina and Carvell estimate a considerably smaller price elas-
ticity using property-level data (see: L. Canina and S. Carvell, 
“Lodging Demand for Urban Hotels in Major Metropolitan 
Markets,” Journal of Hospitality and Tourism Management, forth-
coming, 2005). This small response rate raises questions 
about the eff ectiveness of discount pricing behavior by ho-
tel management during periods of declining demand. See: 
C.A. Enz, “Hotel Pricing in a Wired World,” Cornell Hotel and 
Restaurant Administration Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 1 (February 
2003), pp. 4-5; and C.A. Enz, L. Canina, and M. Lomanno, 
“Why Discounting Doesn’t Work: The Dynamics of Rising 
Occupancy and Falling Revenue among Competitors,” CHR 
Reports, Vol. 7, No. 4 (2004) Cornell University Center for 
Hospitality Research (chr.cornell.edu).
20 Wheaton and Rossoff , op.cit.
21 Canina and Carvell, loc.cit.
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lags diff er by type of hotel property. Both the 
decision- and construction-period lags for lim-
ited-service projects are far shorter than those 
for full-service hotels. This is the main reason 
why limited-service property investment com-
mands greater risk premiums than full-service 
hotel investment (i.e., a diff erence of 65 to 130 
basis points). In general, the delivery lag for 
limited-service developments equals one year 
and full-service developments two or more 
years. Another complicating factor is that not 
all developers begin and end the development 
processes at the same time. Thus, the market-
delivery lag would exceed project-specifi c lag.
(4) What is the delay between a change in mar-
ket occupancy and ADR changes? 
The lead and lag relationship between oc-
cupancy and ADR is well grounded in theo-
ry. Graphically apparent in Exhibit 2, this 
relationship has not been subjected to rigor-
ous empirical examination. This lag is likely 
a matter of weeks and will probably diminish 
as information costs decline. An analysis by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers indicates that occu-
pancy reached a peak in the second quarter of 
2000, while ADR peaked in the fourth quarter 
of 2000.22  
(5) How long is the hotel market cycle? 
The length of the cycle depends on the 
underlying economic factors. Hotel market-
performance data examined over past fi ve de-
cades demonstrate that the hotel market cycle is 
not as symmetrical as that portrayed in Exhibit 
3. Instead, the rise from trough to peak has 
been far more gradual than the decline from 
peak to trough. As with recession and recovery 
in the general economy, hotel-market perfor-
mance erodes more rapidly than it improves. 
During the recent cycle, the upward movement 
from trough to peak occurred over a nine-year 
period (1991 through 2000) and the downward 
movement from peak to trough occurred from 
2000 to 2002.23
Rule 5: Overbuilding Is Not a 
Sure Bet
With respect to supply additions, commercial 
real estate markets appear to fall into two cat-
egories, according to property type. For some 
types such as multifamily, industrial, and small 
retail, the pattern of completions followed the 
business cycle during the past few decades.24
Aggregate demand shocks preceded increases 
in construction activity with a normal response 
pattern suggesting that real-estate cycles for 
these property types are not endogenous. The 
supply additions of offi  ce space,25 regional re-
tail center space,26 and hotel rooms,27 however, 
exhibited less conforming patterns relative to 
those of the general economy. 
The extensive literature on the real-estate-
market oversupply issue off ers plausible, yet 
competing, explanations for overbuilding that 
Wang and Zhou organize as follows.28
(1) Government policy. As an example of this 
category, the most severe oversupply conditions 
in the U.S. commercial real-estate market oc-
curred between 1980 and 1985. Prolonged con-
struction in the presence of weak demand can 
be traced to two federal acts passed in the early 
1980s that created a series of agency and moral-
hazard problems among developers, appraisers, 
and fi nancial institutions. Several papers pres-
ent evidence of the market disruptions associ-
ated with these laws.29
22 PricewaterhouseCoopers, “Dating the Recent Industry 
Cycle,” Hospitality Directions, August 2002, pp. 47-53.
23 Ibid.
24 E. Mills, “Crisis and Recovery in Offi  ce Markets,” 
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Vol. 10, No. 1 
(1995), pp. 49-62; and W. Wheaton, “Real Estate ‘Cycles’: 
Some Fundamentals,” Real Estate Economics, Vol. 27, No. 2 
(1999), pp. 209-230.
25 W. Wheaton, “The Cyclic Behavior of the National 
Offi  ce Market,” AREUEA Journal,  Vol. 15, No. 4 (1987), 
pp. 281-299.
26 J.D. Benjamin, G.D. Jud, and D.T. Winkler, “The 
Supply Adjustment Process in Retail Space Markets,” Journal 
of Real Estate Research, Vol. 15, No. 3 (1998), pp. 297-307.
27 Wheaton and Rossoff , op.cit.
28 K. Wang and Y. Zhou, “Overbuilding: A Game-
Theoretic Approach,” Real Estate Economics, Vol. 28, No. 3 
(2000), pp. 493-522.
29 For example, see: P.J. Corcoran, “Explaining 
the Commercial Real Estate Market,” Journal of Portfolio 
Management, Vol. 13 (Spring 1987), pp. 15-21; A. Auerbach 
and J. Hines, “Investment Tax Incentives and Frequent Tax 
Reforms,” American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 4 (1988), pp. 
211-226; DiPasquale and Wheaton, op.cit.; and Henderschott 
and Kane, op.cit.
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(2) Investment-lag and forecasting-accuracy 
issues. Because it usually takes years to deliver 
commercial property to the market, developers 
(and presumably other capital suppliers) have 
diffi  culty predicting asset prices and rental 
paths to delivery dates. Asset durability and the 
investment lag endemic to real estate lead to cy-
clical extension and oscillation at the height of 
the cycle. Wheaton and Hendershott are two 
researchers who provide evidence to support 
these explanations for continuation of con-
struction during economic downturns.30
(3) Exercise of development options. 
Developers’ decisions to exercise options ei-
ther to move forward with projects or to de-
lay actions also have been off ered as explana-
tions for inopportune concentrations of supply 
growth. Early and universal exercise of develop-
ment options may occur as developers attempt 
to avoid preemption by competitors,31 avoid 
missing demand growth opportunities,32 or en-
gage in other types of herd behavior.33 Wang 
and Zhou show that early and simultaneous 
option exercises result from a wish to limit car-
rying costs.34
Wang and Zhou also show that the land-
to-building-cost ratio is a condition that ex-
plains why overbuilding is more likely to occur 
with some property types than others. They 
conclude that offi  ce and hotel markets are the 
most likely to experience development booms 
not supported by the local economics due to 
the relatively high cost of holding land in in-
ventory for these uses.
Depictions of Hotel Overbuilding
Exhibit 5 (on the next page) presents the fol-
lowing three alternative scenarios for hotel 
overbuilding, assuming an exogenous cycle.
Peak persistence. Panel A shows supply 
growth accelerating with a lag at t as the de-
mand for space increases along with a general 
economic recovery. But in t + 1, supply growth 
continues at a sustained rate well beyond peak 
demand (i.e., peak persistence). Entering the 
latter part of t + 1, supply growth subsides and 
begins to realign with the business cycle. In 
t + 2, construction levels may reach a point at 
which the market becomes underbuilt before 
eventually becoming realigned with the busi-
ness cycle. 
Peak oscillation. The conditions in Panel 
B are identical to those in Panel A except that 
supply exhibits oscillating behavior at the peak 
(i.e., peak oscillation). Again, newly construct-
ed space arrives during a downturn. 
Self-correcting cycle. Panel C presents the 
supply cycle assuming self-correcting behavior 
in which Sc = Sa = Sb at t and t + 2, but dur-
ing t + 1, Sc < Sa, Sb. The scenario portrayed in 
Panel C produces overbuilding in commercial 
real-estate markets. Because construction activ-
ity is responsive to early demand signals, how-
ever, the extent of overbuilding is far less severe 
than in the other scenarios. The supply-growth 
pattern in Panel C depicts the behavior dur-
ing the most recent cycle of certain segments of 
the real estate market that have been especially 
prone to overbuilding.
It has been nearly 20 years since U.S. hotel 
markets exhibited abnormal supply growth to 
the extent that these markets might be labeled 
overbuilt and their fi nancial stability would 
30 See: Wheaton, op.cit.; and P.H. Hendershott, 
“Property Asset Bubbles: Evidence from the Sidney Offi  ce 
Market,” Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Vol. 20, 
No. 1 (2000), pp. 67-81.
31 S. Grenadier, “The Strategic Exercise of Options: 
Development Cascades and Overbuilding in Real Estate 
Markets,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 51, No. 5 (1996), pp. 1220-
1338.
32 A. Bar-Ilan and W.C. Strange, “Investment Lags,” 
American Economic Review, Vol. 86, No. 3 (1996), pp. 610-
622.
33 P.D. Childs, S.H. Ott, and T.J. Riddiough, “Optimal 
Valuation of Noisy Real Assets,” Real Estate Economics, Vol. 
30, No. 3 (2002), pp. 385-414.
34 Wang and Zhou, op.cit.
It has been nearly 20 years since U.S. 
hotel markets exhibited abnormal 
supply growth to the extent that these 
markets might be labeled overbuilt.
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be threatened. From the early 1990s through 
the early 2000s the hotel industry experienced 
a complete cycle. Exogenous demand condi-
tions arose during the middle and late 1990s 
that could have produced a substantial hotel 
supply overhang by 2002, but the supply side 
of commercial real estate markets remained 
disciplined. As demand weakened in the ear-
ly 2000s, endogenous supply growth resulting 
from the types of developer behavior should 
have resulted in overbuilding, according to op-
tions theorists’ predictions, but that did not 
occur. Grenadier states: “Sometimes markets 
sit idle for years and then blast off  in a surge 
of construction.”35 We may soon learn wheth-
er the U.S. hotel markets have been in a pro-
longed idle state and a surge in construction is 
imminent, or whether historical blast off s are 
simply manifestations of undisciplined and an-
tiquated behavior.
 Rule #6: Look under Hotel-
capitalization-rate Rocks 
The ratio of property-level operating income 
to asset price—the capitalization or cap rate—
35 Grenadier, p. 1677.
EXHIBIT 5
THRE E  CYCLICA L HOTE L-SU P P LY P A TTE RNS
GDP
GDP
GDP
Supply (Sa)
Supply (Sc)
SQ
UA
RE
 F
EE
T
SQ
UA
RE
 F
EE
T
SQ
UA
RE
 F
EE
T
TIME T T + 1 T + 2
PANEL A
PE A K PE RSISTE NCE
PANEL B
PE A K OSCILLA TION
PANEL C
SE LF-CORRE CTION
R
EAL $
R
EAL $
R
EAL $
Note: By assumption each cyclical pattern is fundamentally connected to the business cycle. Panel A shows peak 
persistence, when supply growth continues even as demand fades. Panel B shows peak oscillation, when supply 
additions continue in uneven or oscillating fashion, as demand declines. Panel C shows a self-correcting cycle, when 
construction activity responds fairly promptly to diminishing demand.
Supply (Sb)
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provides an important foundation for rational 
hotel-investment and -fi nancing decisions, as it 
does for other types of real estate. Unlike the 
ratios of other property types, both the numera-
tor and denominator of the hotel ratio may 
experience sudden movements of unexpected 
magnitude, making hotel cap-rate interpreta-
tions especially diffi  cult. 
Exhibit 6 presents a twelve-year history of 
full-service-hotel cap rates in the U.S.36 Hotel 
cap rates appear to follow a countercyclical pat-
tern. The highest rate, slightly above 12 per-
cent, occurred at the end of the early 1990s 
recession. The reported rate reached 11.7 per-
cent during the 2001–02 recession, and has de-
clined to the low-10-percent range since 2002. 
Hotel cap rates moved downward and broke 
through the 10-percent barrier for several quar-
ters in 1997 and 1998 when the economy was 
rapidly expanding. 
In theory, hotel cap rates should conform 
to a countercyclical pattern because hotel prop-
erty values logically decline as incomes fall (and 
rise as incomes increase). The same historical 
pattern of cap rates emerges for other proper-
ty types. As Corcoran concluded, a countercy-
clical pattern of cap rates for leased properties 
provides evidence of undisciplined markets.37
The recent fi rming of property prices at the 
bottom of the business cycle, in contrast, in-
dicates disciplined markets and mean-reversion 
expectations for NOI as leases roll over. If real-
estate markets continue to exhibit disciplined 
behavior, hotel cap rates will continue to be 
countercyclical and other property cap rates 
will follow pro-cyclical paths.
36 This information comes from the Real Estate Research 
Corporation (Real Estate Report, Real Estate Investment Survey, 
RERC, 2005), which conducts quarterly surveys of institu-
tional real estate investors and lenders to assemble consensus 
estimates of key market performance indicators. The consis-
tency of RERC’s administration and application of defi ni-
tions for their surveys results in a reliable time series. In fact, 
the RERC data represent the only historical data of hotel cap 
rates available for each quarter since 1992.
EXHIBIT 6
HOTE L CA P ITA LIZ A TION RA TE S, 1992–2005
37 Corcoran, pp. 35-44.
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Source: Real Estate Research Corporation.
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Spread —Wide or Narrow?
Another perspective on hotel cap rates comes 
after examining historical spreads relative to 
other capital-market rates. Exhibit 7 shows 
hotel cap rates minus ten-year Treasuries and 
Moodys Baa corporate bond series since 1992. 
As with rate levels, the spreads appear to be 
countercyclical. This means that hotel risk 
premiums move, as they should, above the 
long-run average during recession and below 
the average during periods of economic expan-
sion. Average spreads since 1992 equal 508 
basis points above ten-year Treasuries and 294 
basis points over Moodys Baa bonds. In the 
fi rst quarter of 2005, hotel cap-rate spreads 
exceed the average for the historical period. 
The current spreads between hotel cap rates 
and capital-market benchmarks indicate that 
these rates could fall by more than a few basis 
points, given the assumption that spreads will 
realign with historical averages.
Judging the Direction of Hotel Cap 
Rates
If one assumes that income will grow at a con-
stant rate, then the cap rate, R, equals the dis-
count rate, r, minus the assumed growth rate, 
g. Stated symbolically,
 R = r – g.     (5)
The discount rate equals a risk-free rate 
plus a premium return for risk, which repre-
sents the expected volatility of the income 
stream(s). In equation form,
 r = rf + rp. (6)
EXHIBIT 7
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Combining Equations (5) and (6) presents 
the capitalization rate in expanded form.
 R = (rf + rp) – g.  (7)
Simultaneous changes in its components 
cause R to change, sometimes in unpredict-
able ways. This problem is exacerbated dur-
ing unstable times, including the recent past. 
Tracking the directional pattern of R, and at-
tempting to judge turning points, requires an 
understanding of how and why the compo-
nents of R change. 
Panels A and B of Exhibit 8 show vari-
ous scenarios for changes in R. As presented 
in Panel A, the discount rate (r) changes in ac-
cordance with the direction and magnitudes of 
changes in its two components, rf and rp. Under 
Market Condition 1, r increases because one 
or both components increase and neither one 
decreases. Similarly, Market Condition 2 has 
r decreasing because one or both components 
decline and neither increases. Ambiguous 
changes in discount rates occur under Market 
Conditions 3 and 4 because of the opposite di-
EXHIBIT 8
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Developed by the author for: “How to Determine the Future Direction of Hotel Capitalization Rates,” Real Estate 
Issues, Vol. 28 (Winter 2003), pp. 44–48.
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38 J.B. Corgel and J.A. deRoos, “Buying High and 
Selling Low in the Lodging-Property Market,” Cornell Hotel and 
Restaurant Administration Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 6 (December 
1994), pp. 33-38.
rectional changes of the components. During 
times when such conditions exist, knowing the 
prevailing direction of changes in the compo-
nents of r is not enough information because 
the relative magnitude of the changes in rf and 
rp must be known to predict the future direc-
tion of r.
Is it likely that rf and rp will move in op-
posite directions? The answer to this question 
is a qualifi ed yes. Component rf changes with 
macroeconomic movements, including fi scal- 
and monetary-policy changes. Component rp 
adjusts as the risk of the specifi c asset class ad-
justs. Some of this risk adjustment is undoubt-
edly systematic in nature, but a substantial 
portion occurs because of asset-class repricing 
due to changes in the risk relative to other as-
set classes. Consequently, interest rates may fall 
while the relative risks of a particular asset class 
increase, as long as the assets’ incomes are not 
entirely fi xed over the long run, as in the case 
of a pure bond. 
Hotel-asset income streams are the least 
similar to bond incomes among property types. 
Thus, the pricing of hotel assets should be less 
interest-rate sensitive than are offi  ce, retail, and 
other unsecuritized real estate investments. 
Rule #7: The People Can Mess 
Things Up
Hotel market intelligence also comes from 
consideration of the behavioral phenomena 
that surround property transactions. Because 
of the complexity of hotel-property investment, 
nonfi nancial factors may infl uence how buyers 
and sellers behave beyond their responses to 
income estimates and the capitalization rates. 
Specifi cally, buyers’ and sellers’ motivations 
may aff ect property sale prices. 
Each contract for sale represents the agree-
ment on price and terms reached by a specifi c 
buyer and a specifi c seller. The idea that the 
price of a hotel may be diff erent in the case of 
one buyer and seller combination compared to 
another pair for the same property is rooted in 
the belief that buyer and seller characteristics 
infl uence transactions even though the prop-
erty-related factors remain the same. Theory of-
fers three reasons that a given buyer behaves 
diff erently from other buyers and a given seller 
behaves diff erently from other sellers. First, ev-
ery participant is capable of errors because no 
participant has all of the information necessary 
to always make correct decisions. Second, buy-
ers and sellers are not equally patient. Some 
sellers, for example, are overly eager to sell and 
thus sell at low prices, while other sellers are 
willing to wait for their price. Finally, there are 
strategic reasons why market participants may 
be willing to transact for the same property at 
diff erent prices. A hotel company, for example, 
may value a hotel more than an individual in-
vestor because of a competitive edge the prop-
erty provides to the brand. 
In a study with Jan deRoos, I empirically 
demonstrated that buyers and sellers behave 
diff erently in the same types of hotel-proper-
ty transactions and that these behaviors have 
price eff ects.38 Some key fi ndings from our 
study are as follows:
(1) Considerable “noise trading” occurred 
in the hotel asset markets during the period 
1985 through 1992 (the period covered in our 
study). Japanese buyers overpaid for hotels by 
45 percent on average and the RTC undersold 
assets by 34 percent. 
(2) Individual buyers and sellers consistent-
ly mispriced hotel assets, presumably because 
of their inability to absorb the high informa-
tion costs of participating in these markets.
We were surprised by our fi ndings, giv-
en the homogeneous nature of hotel assets. 
Regardless of business cycles or 
asset ratios, individuals buy and sell 
based on their own motivations.
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Approximately 70 percent of U.S. hotels have 
a brand affi  liation. The consistency of brand 
affi  liation should lower information costs and 
hence minimize noise trading.
Rule #8: Hotel Debt—Float Like 
a Butterfly, Sting Like a Bee 
The conceptual premise for deciding on the 
type of debt fi nancing to pursue when making 
hotel-fi nancing decisions should be to minimize 
the likelihood of fi nancial distress by success-
fully matching debt-service obligations with 
cash fl ow. In the case of hotels, investors may 
believe that revenue and net income have a posi-
tive (i.e., pro-cyclical) relationship with interest 
rates. In that case, fl oating-rate debt should be 
viable. Nevertheless, investors could be hesitant 
to fi nance hotels with fl oating-rate structures 
for the following reasons. (1) The relationship 
between hotel income and interest rates may 
be disturbed periodically by the complicating 
infl uences of consumption decisions and in-
vestment decisions in the underlying markets. 
(2) No empirical studies have confi rmed or 
refuted the argument that hotel income and 
interest rates have a long-run stable and positive 
relationship. (3) Investors accept the persistent 
notion of locking into low fi xed-rates.
With Scott Gibson, I conducted a study 
which found that hotel revenues and interest 
rates (as delineated by the LIBOR) have been 
highly and signifi cantly correlated since 1987, 
and especially so since 1995 (see Exhibit 9).39
39 J.B. Corgel and S. Gibson, “The Use of Fixed-rate and 
Floating-rate Debt for Hotels,” Cornell Hotel and Restaurant 
Administration Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. 4 (November 2005), pp. 
413–430.
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Correlations of monthly levels and quarterly 
changes are consistently strong across nearly all 
market segments and locations. We ran a sim-
ulation that compared the eff ects of fi xed-rate 
loans and fl oating-rate loans on hotels’ ability 
to service debt. Our simulation demonstrated 
that fi nancial distress can be most eff ectively 
managed with fl oating-rate debt, based on the 
best available historical information. 
Gibson and I also examined the question 
of whether hotel owners are wise to lock into 
fi xed-rate debt during periods of relatively low 
interest rates. We argued as follows: In the ab-
sence of profi table arbitrage opportunities, the 
long-term rate represents an average of the cur-
rent short-term rate and expected future short-
term rates. When long-term rates are relatively 
low, participants in the fi nancial markets ex-
pect that future short-term rates will also be rel-
atively low. The implication is that hotel own-
ers, on average, will not pay a lower average rate 
by taking out a fi xed-rate loan rather than a 
fl oating-rate loan. Empirical evidence supports 
this claim, showing that corporate managers 
do not exhibit an ability to time their debt is-
sues to take advantage of low rates.40 Unless the 
hotel owner knows more about the direction 
of future interest rates than others in the credit 
markets, then trying to lock in a fi xed rate at 
the bottom of the market is futile. Rather than 
trying to time the interest-rate market, hotel 
owners’ eff orts are better spent trying to man-
40 A. Butler, G. Grullon, and J. Weston, “Can Managers 
Forecast Aggregate Market Returns?,” Journal of Finance, forth-
coming, 2005.
age fi nancial distress by aligning operating cash 
fl ows and debt-service obligations.  
In fi nancing a hotel, investors will consid-
er a continuum of simple fi nancing choices. 
At the extreme left on this continuum is 100-
percent fi xed-rate debt, and on the extreme 
right, 100-percent fl oating-rate fi nancing. Real-
estate investors may be tempted to begin their 
fi nancing plans on the left of the continuum, 
that is, with entirely fi xed-rate debt, and then 
move to the right by substituting fl oating-rate 
debt as relative terms and risks indicate. Given 
the fi xed-income patterns associated with 
leased properties, this approach appears logical 
for fi nancing apartments and offi  ce, retail, and 
industrial real estate. In contrast, the absence 
of leases suggests the opposite approach for ho-
tel fi nancing—that is, to start with fl oating-rate 
debt.  
Going Forward: 
What We Soon May Learn
The steady improvement of knowledge about 
hotel market behavior that has occurred over 
recent decades suggests that, even if market 
activity remains as it is today over the next fi ve 
years, considerable additional knowledge would 
accumulate. Market participants, of course, 
never stop reacting to information regarding 
world events, and because of the position in 
the cycle hotel markets now occupy, the op-
portunity to increase our knowledge base and 
predictive ability appears substantial. Some 
real estate market observers, Corcoran, for ex-
ample, put forward the idea that a combina-
tion of learned behavior and lower information 
costs will produce more vigilant capital markets 
than those operating in the recent past and 
generally smoother cycles.41 Indeed, I would 
be surprised (given the availability of detailed 
construction data) if the hotel markets experi-
enced the wide swings in construction activity 
and property prices that occurred during the 
last two decades. As hotel demand continues 
to exceed supply in many important markets 
41 Corcoran, pp. 35-44.
The strong recovery of hotel markets 
since 2002 dispels the notion that 
lodging demand can be permanently 
diminished by catastrophic events 
and war.
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(e.g., New York City), we will soon learn more 
about how this market behaves at a peak in the 
cycle. In the absence of softening demand, it 
now appears that U.S. hotel markets will re-
main at the peak for a prolonged period be-
cause steadily increasing development costs are 
stalling supply growth.
 Most of what we will learn about ho-
tel markets during the next fi ve years involves 
the timing of behavior in a particular market 
and the connections of that behavior across 
Do you have a response to or comment on this report?
The Center for Hospitality Research welcomes 
comments, whether brief responses or more formal 
commentaries of 1,000 to 3,000 words, on this and other 
reports.
To participate in this on-line forum, contact The Center’s 
executive director, at hosp_research@cornell.edu.
markets. For example, by 2008 we will know a 
lot more about the lead and lag relationships 
identifi ed in this article. Analysts today are fo-
cused on how hotel market demand reacts to 
changing conditions in the general economy, 
as well as those in local  or regional economies. 
As a closing point, the strong recovery of hotel 
markets since 2002 dispels the position held by 
some experts that lodging demand can be per-
manently disabled by catastrophic events and 
war. ✯✯✯✯✯
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